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AN END-OF-LIFE QUANDARY IN NEED OF A
STATUTORY RESPONSE: WHEN PATIENTS
DEMAND LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
THAT PHYSICIANS ARE UNWILLING TO
PROVIDE
Abstract: For decades, the pressing end-of-life treatment issue was whether
patients had the right to decline life-sustaining medical treatment. They
do, and that right is now firmly established. A significant patient auton-
omy issue, however, remains unresolved: do patients have the right to
demand and receive life-sustaining treatment when such treatment is con-
trary to the standard of care? Current precedent in the area provides un-
certain guidance for health care professionals struggling to ascertain their
obligations, as well as for patients wanting to know their rights. Yet, pa-
tient-physician disagreement on end-of-life care will continue, especially
as medical technology improves. A process-based statute provides the best
Framework for addressing patient demands for care that are opposed by
physicians and hospitals. This Note contends that the Texas Advance Di-
rectives Act is an effective model.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in 1990 in Crtaan v.
Director; Missouri Department of Health recognized an implied right of a
competent - patient to decline life-sustaining medical treatment. 1 The
decision was a capstone in the achievement of a national legal consen-
sus that competent adults may refuse any unwanted medical interven-
tions, even when the refusal may result in death. 2 Incompetent patients
I See 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). Chief justice Rehnquist's majority opinion states that
"Wile principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred by our prior decisions" and thus
avoids explicit recognition of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in freedom from
unwanted medical interventions. See id.
2 See id.; _John j. Paris & Michael D. Schriebner, Physician's Refusal to Provide lifer
Prolonging Medical Interventions, 23 CLINICS IN PEanvaToi.oc.v 563, 563 (1996); see also Ju-
dith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy a a Physician's Professional Conscience, 44
HAsTiNos L.J. 1241, 1241 (1993) (discussing Cruzan in the context of other patient auton-
omy cases in the end-of-life setting); Keith Shiner, Note, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?,
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 803, 811-12 (1996) (noting that Cruzan was the Supreme Court's
recognition of common law-developed patient autonomy). Currently, the right to decline
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retain a similar right to be exercised on their behalf by a health care
proxy or guardian, although that right is subject to state evidentiary re-
quirements. 8
Seventeen years after Cruzan, however, a significant patient auton-
omy issue remains unresolved. 4
 Namely, do patients have the right to
demand, and receive, life-sustaining medical treatment when such
treatment is contrary to the prevailing standard of medical care? 5 In
other words, does a patient's negative right to decline life-sustaining
treatment extend into an affirmative right to receive requested life-
sustaining measures?6
Take, for example, the case of Barbara Howe, 7
 In December of
1991, Barbara was diagnosed with ALS, and she executed a health care
proxy designating her daughter Carol as her health care agent.8 Bar-
bara expressed her wish to undergo life-sustaining treatment so long as
she could interact.with her family. 9
 She was admitted to Massachusetts
General Hospital (the "Hospital") in 1999 and, by April 22, 2001, her
attending physician stated that, in his best medical judgment, her con-
dition would not improve and that she could no longer communicate
life-sustaining treatment is protected by statute in all fifty states, supported by federal law,
and implicitly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Patient Self-Determination
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273; Alicia R. Ouellete, When
Vitalism Is Dead Wrong. The Discrimination Against and 'Torture of Incompetent Patients by Com-
pulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 3-7 & n.7 (2004).
3
 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
4 See id.; see also Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21
Am. J.L. & MEn. 221, 231 (1995) (arguing that there is no legal obligation to provide end-
of-life care that is not medically indicated); Paul R. Helft at al., The Rise and Fall of the Futil-
ity Movement, 343 NEW ENG. J. MEI). 293, 296 (2000) (addressing the lack of consensus
concerning life-sustaining treatment contrary to the medical standard of care and suggest-
ing that, in the absence of a consensus, such care must he provided); Robert M. Veatch &
Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 Am. J.L. &
MEn. 15, 36 (1992) (noting that state licensure of physicians gives rise to an affirmative
obligation to provide aggressive end-of-life treatment when such treatment is requested).
5 See Daar, supra note 4, at 231; Helft et al., supra note 4, at 296; Veatch & Spicer, supra
note 4, at 36.
6 See Daar, supra note 4, at 231; fIelft et al., supra note 4, at 296; Veatch & Spicer, supra
note 4, at 36.
7 See In re Howe, Nu. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *1 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Mar.
22, 2004).
8 Id. at *2-3.
6 Id. at *11.
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meaningfully with her family. 10 At Carol's request, though, aggressive
treatment continued."
Beginning in the spring of 2003, Barbara's inability to close—and
thereby lubricate—her eyes resulted in a corneal ulcer on her tight eye
that, in turn, necessitated its surgical removal. 12 Thereafter, Barbara's
left eye was taped shut for the majority of the day, untaped only in the
presence of her daughters so as to ensure visual contact with her fam-
ily. 13 Barbara had become so frail that during the regular course of her
treatment to prevent bed sores, she suffered rib and leg fractures. 14 Fol-
lowing Barbara's eye removal, the Hospital's ethics committee, known
as the Optimum Care Committee, found that the continued care of
Barbara Howe "demands that the entire body of caregivers violate their
professional oaths, the standards of medical and nursing practice, the
standards of the Massachusetts General Hospital, and the standards of
ethics, morality, human decency and common sense: 15 On June 18,
2003, the Hospital filed a petition for declaratory relief, and requested
from the Probate and Family Court a determination as to the appropri-
ate level of care that must be afforded to Barbara Howe. 18 Ultimately,
the Hospital wanted to discontinue ventilatory support, and sought ju-
dicial approval to do so. 17
Unlike the established right to refuse medical treatment, there is
no consensus about whether a patient has an affirmative right to de-
mand treatment and compel the provision of that treatment when the
physician is unwilling to comply. 18 In re Howe and similar cases illus-
trate the tension between complying with a patient's expressed wishes
and allowing health care providers to stop treatment when they are
professionally and ethically obligated to do so. 19 The right to refuse
10 Id. at *4. The physician informed Carol Howe that "keeping [her mother] alive by
extraordinary means seems only to offer her the opportunity to suffer greatly, and is more
like torture than respectful medical care." Id. at *5.
11 Id. at *11.
12 See Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *10-11.
13 See id. at * 12.
14 See id. at *13.
15 See id. at *11-12.
16 See id. at *1 .
17 See Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *1.
18 See Paul A. Gomez, Comment, Promises and Pitfalls: An Analysis of the Shifting Constitu-
tional Interests Involved in the Context of Demanding a Right to Treatment in Health Care, 64 Aut.
L. Ra'. 361, 383-85 (2000-01) (comparing the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
with the right to demand life-sustaining treatment, and arguing that the Former is well-
established but the latter is nonexistent).
19 See id.
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medical treatment has extensive common law history and its applica-
tion to the end-of-life context is a logical extension of that history. 2°
By contrast, there is not a clear legal progression when the issue turns
to the patient's right to receive demanded treatment. 2' State malprac-
tice law holds health care providers to the standard of medical care,
and, therefore, patients can effectively demand elements of medical
care that are required to meet the malpractice standard. 22 Cases like
that of Barbara Howe, however, involve requests for treatment that
exceed this standard and tread into murky legal precedent. 23
The basic framework of the dispute is simple: a patient requests
care that the health care provider is unwilling to give. 24 When put in
the end-of-life context, though, the consequences become life and
death, and questions that were formerly legal and medical in nature
become equal parts political, moral, and theological. 25 This context,
together with the lack of common law history, yields inconsistent
precedent.26
 Indeed, the current precedent in this area is, at best,
conflicting. 27 On the one hand, cases indicate that if the hospital or
26 See Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. U. 1091, 1092 (1998).
21 See Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *11-12; Menikoff, supra note 20, at 1092.
22
 Menikoff, supra note 20, at 1093.
22 See	 see also Daar, supra note 4, at 223 (noting that "a review of existing case and
statutory law in the area of medical futility shows that courts and lawmakers have promul-
gated vague and ill-defined policies which have left them susceptible to patient claims for
limitless treatment").
24 See Menikoff, supra note 20, at 1094. Professor Menikoff argues that, in this instance,
"ii] f the appropriate medical standard of care does not otherwise require the physician to
offer the care, then the physician cannot be compelled to provide the care merely because
the patient asked for it, whether or not it is reasonable to want that care." Id.
25 See George J. Annas, "Culture of Life" Politics at the Bedside—The Case of Terri Schiavo,
352 1•11,:w ENG. j. MED. 1710, 1712 (2005) (describing the lengthy judicial process, and
subsequent state and federal legislative involvement, that marked the decision concerning
the end-of-life medical treatment of Terri Schiavo). Interestingly, the case of Terri Schiavo
involved treatment issues "that most lawyers, bioethicists, and physicians believed were well
settled," resulted in no changes in the law, "nor involved any arguments that legal changes
were necessary." Id. at 1710, 1714. The issues in the demand context are not well settled,
and, presumably, carry the same potential for a national political saga as the Schiavo case.
See id. at 1714.
26 Compare In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA") requires continued
treatment), with Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding that EMTALA does not provide a cause of action when a do-not-resuscitate
order is instituted and acted upon against the patient's wishes).
27 Compare Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596 (holding that EMTALA requires continued treat-
ment), with Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351 (holding that EMTALA does not provide a cause of ac-
tion when a do-not-resuscitate order is instituted and acted upon against the patient's
wishes).
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patient seeks declaratory relief before the health care provider's re-
fusal of life-sustaining treatment, the hospital will be compelled to
continue the treatment, irrespective of whether the treatment is
medically indicated.28 On the other hand, if life-sustaining treatment
is withheld without judicial approval, and the patient dies, the hospi-
tal may not be liable if it acted pursuant to the standard of care. 29
Thus, the legal answers to the questions posed by patient auton-
omy in the demand context are inconclusive." The questions, however,
will continue to persist, especially as life-extending medical technology
advances and hospitals increasingly become the setting for end-of-life
decision making. 3 ' The problem is ripe for state statutory response, and
the 1999 Texas Advance Directives Act ("the Texas Act" or "the Act")
provides an effective mode1. 32 The Texas Act is a response to the issues
raised in the conflicting case law, and establishes a process-based resolu-
tion to disputes arising from patient or proxy requests for life-sustaining
medical treatment that conflict with the standard of care."
This Note contends that a statutory remedy is necessary to address
patient-physician disagreement over the provision of care demanded by
the patient, and that the Texas Act is a worthy mode1. 34 Part 1 addresses
the conflicting judicial responses to patient demands for life-sustaining
treatment over the objections of health care providers." Part II dis-
cusses the ill-fated futility movement, a medical and legal effort to de-
fine a class of treatment that physicians were not obligated to provide,"
9.3 See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596; In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Mints. Prob. Ct. Hennepin
County June 28, 1991), reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 369, 370-72 (1991).
29 See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351-52; me also Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072,
1075 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the withdrawal of aggressive lift-sustaining treat-
ment is a medical procedure, and that claims brought upon such a withdrawal must estab-
lish that the withdrawal did not conform to the standard of care).
3° See Daar, supra note 4, at 240.
31 See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 530 (2d ed. 1995). Professor Meisel argues that
"[tlhis debate, which is just beginning to be played out in the courts, is likely to occupy as
much, if not more, judicial effort in the coming years as conventional right-to-die cases
have in the last two decades unless legislation cuts it short." Id.
22 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (providing
for an extrajudicial procedure when the physician recommends against life-sustaining
treatment that the patient wishes to continue); see also Robert L. Fine & Thomas W. Mayo,
Resolution of Futility by Due Process: Early Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 138
ANNALS INTERNAL. MED. 743, 745-46 (2003) (evaluating Texas's experience with the Act,
and recommending the Act as a model for other states).
55 See 166.052; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 745-46.
34
 See § 166.052; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 745-46.
35 See infra notes 41-165 and accompanying text.
36 See it 	 notes 166-201 and accompanying text.
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That movement stalled because of an inability to define futility in a uni-
versally accepted fashion. 57
 Part II further notes the difficulty of at-
tempting to solve the problems associated with demanded care with a
one-word catch-all, and demonstrates the ineffectiveness of an impre-
cise futility statute." Then, it summarizes and analyzes various potential
resolutions, including a statutory resolution, and summarizes the Texas
Act." Finally, Part III explains why a process-based statute such as the
Texas Act provides the most effective resolution, in part by contrasting
the resolution of the 2005 Texas Court of Appeals case of Hudson v.
Texas Children's Hospital, in which the process-based Texas Act was appli-
cable, with the resolution of Howe in the Probate and Family Court of
Massachusetts, where there was no applicable statute. 4°
I. LIFE-SUSTAINING INCONSISTENCY
The role of a physician, as suggested by the Hippocratic Corpus,
includes an "obligation to abstain from treating those who are overmas-
tered by their diseases, because medicine is powerless in that instance."'"
In the end-of-life context, this obligation often collides with notions of
patient autonomy when patients request treatment that will not produce
a medical benefit." These fundamental disagreements about treatment
between physicians and patients are a continuing problem, though most
disputes never reach the courtroom." Of those that do, many are ren-
37 See Helft et al., supra note 4, at 293-96 (providing an overview of the futility debate).
38 See infra notes 202-212 and accompanying text_
59 Sew infra notes 213-270 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 271-342 and accompanying text.
41
 James J. Murphy, Comment, Beyond Autonomy: Judicial Restraint and the Legal Limits
Necessary to Uphold the Hippocratic Tradition and Preserve the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Pro-
fession, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoCv 451, 466 (1993); see Matthew S. Ferguson, Note,
Ethical Postures of Futility and California's Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, 75 S. CAL. L. Rev.
1217, 1229 (2001-02).
42 See Hat et al., supra note 4, at 294 (noting that patient-physician conflict in the de-
mand context is, essentially, a debate between patients' autonomy and physicians' auton-
omy). This conflict may be considered, as it is in this Note, a disagreement between patient
requests and provider belief that the requested treatment will result in harm to the patient
without a concomitant benefit or provide no benefit at all, and thus would he contrary to
the standards of medical practice. See Menikoff, supra note 20, at 1124. Other critiques
address this issue as a potential area for rationing scarce medical resources. Set John 1).
Lantos & Robert M. Taylor, The Politics of Medical Futility, II Issues L. & Men, 3, 11-12
(1995) (postulating that discussions of medically futile treatments and rationing are often
intertwined, though not explicitly so). The resource allocation aspect will not he a focus of
this Note.
43 See Helft et al., supra note 4, at 294.
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dered moot by transfer or death of the patient." Until the 2005 Texas
Court of Appeals case of Hudson v. Texas Children's Hospital, each time a
patient sought life-sustaining treatment and the health care provider
objected, contending that such treatment was contrary to the standard
of care, the courts found in favor of the patient. 45 In each instance,
however, the court did not directly rule on the issue of whether a pa-
tient has the right to demand and receive life-sustaining treatment that
is contrary to the standard of care. 46
A. Resolving the Matter Without Resolving the Issue:
Baby L, In re Wanglie, & In re Baby K
Read together, the cases of Baby L, In re Wanglie, and In re Baby K
demonstrate the complexity of the issues involved when patient re-
quests for life-sustaining treatment are met with physician refusal on
the grounds that such treatment is contrary to the standard of medical
care.47 Though the cases each involve substantially similar facts and ef-
fectively similar outcomes, they do not constitute a patient's affirmative
right to demand and receive life-sustaining treatment. 48 Instead, the
case of Baby L illustrates the potential of patient transfer to remedy
disputes between physicians and patients over the course of end-of-life
treatment in the demand context." Wanglie holds that demanding
treatment contrary to the standard of care does not alone constitute
44 See id. at 296; see also John J. Paris et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The
Case of Baby I., 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1013 (1990); infra notes 52-65 and accompany-
ing text.
45 See Helft et al., supra note 4, at 296 (noting, at the time, that no court had approved
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment over patient objections). Compare Hudson v.
Tex. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. App. 2005) (setting the stage for the
denial of an injunction sought by mother to order the continuance of life-sustaining treat-
ment for her child), with In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that EM-
TALA required continued aggressive treatment for an anencephalic infant).
46 See Baby k 16 F.3d at 596 (explicitly leaving this issue unresolved, and ruling instead
on the application of EMTALA); In re Wangle, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Prob. Gt. Hennepin
County June 28, 1991), reprinted in7 Issum L. & MEn. 369, 377 (1991); see also John J. Paris
et al., Beyond Autonomy: Physicians' Refusal to Use Life-Prolonging Extrac.mporeal Membrane Oxy
genation, 329 NEW ENG.J. MEn. 354, 356 (1993) (discussing physician refusal to provide
extracorporeal membrane oxygenation to a critically ill five-year-old patient).
47 See Baby 16 F.3c1 at 596; Wanglie, iv/printed in 7 IssuEs L. & MEn. at 376; Paris et al.,
supra note 44, at 1012-13; see also 1-Ielft et al., supra note 4, at 296 (noting that the courts
did not recognize a right of physicians to act unilaterally in cases in which they thought the
care would be futile).
48 See Baby X 16 F.3d at 596; Wangle, reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & Men. at 376; Paris et al.,
supra note 44, at 1012-13; see also Hellt et al., supra note 4, at 296.
49 See Paris et al., supra note 44, at 1012-13.
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reason to replace a well-qualified guardian, but remains silent• on
whether the hospital must provide the demanded care. 50 Baby K dem-
onstrates that medical care contrary to prevailing standards of care
must be provided when required under federal statute. 5 I
1. The First Case: Baby L
In 1990, the New England journal of Medicine reported on the case of
Baby L, "the first time that physicians—even in the face of judicial inter-
vention—have denied a request for potentially life-prolonging medical
treatment for a patient in acute crisis."52
 Baby L was born prematurely
after a complicated pregnancy. 55
 During the child's first twenty-three
months, she suffered recurrent pneumonia, intermittent episodes of
uncontrolled seizures, and four cardiopulmonary arrests, and under-
went three major surgeries." In the medical opinion of her attending
physicians, Baby L had suffered such extensive neurological defects that
she could experience only pain.55
 Baby L's mother, however, continued
to demand that everything possible be done to prolong the child's life. 56
Faced with the mother's request, the hospital convened an institu-
tion-wide meeting, including the chiefs of service, primary care physi-
cians, nurses, hospital counsel, and chairpersons of the institutional
ethics committee.57
 They unanimously agreed that further care was not
in the best interests of the child or consistent with standard medical
practice, and refused to provide continued mechanical ventilation. 58
The hospital stabilized the child and actively sought another hospital
facility willing to abide by the mother's decision on treatment. 59
 Mean-
while, the mother sought an injunction in probate court to order con-
tinued ventilation.°
50 See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 lssu Ks L. & Mao. at 376.
51 See Baby K, 16 F.3c1 at 596.
52 Paris et al., supra note 44, at 1012-13.
" See id. at 1012.
54 See id. These surgeries included a gastrostorny and a tracheostomy. See id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Paris at al., supra note 44, at 1012.
58 See a In so doing, the hospital cited Thaphy a New England Sinai Hospua4 noting that
there is nothing in the law "which would justify compelling medical professionals . to
take active measures which are contrary to their view of their ethical duty toward their
patients." Id. (quoting 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (Mass. 1986)).
" Id.
60 Id.
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The legal dispute was rendered moot when the guardian ad litem
consulted a pediatric neurologist from another institution to assess the
patient's condition.61 The neurologist felt that continued aggressive
care was the proper course of treatment for Baby L, and accepted care
of the infant.62
The case of Baby L presented the issue of patient demands clash-
ing with a health care institution's refusal to provide aggressive medi-
cal care it viewed as contrary to accepted medical standards. 65 The
resolution did not produce a judicial statement on the best way to re-
solve this issue. 64 It did, however, involve a standard extrajudicial solu-
tion that is an essential component in any statute—namely, the facili-
tation of a transfer to a physician willing to provide the care. 65
2. In re Wanglie: The "Right to Life"?
Unlike the case of Baby L, the physician-patient disagreement over
the course of Helga Wanglie's end-of-life medical care yielded a court
decision.° In 1991, the Hennepin County Probate Court of Minnesota,
in In re Wanglie, issued the first judicial decision to confront the situa-
tion of physicians seeking the withdrawal of life-sustaining care against
a patient's wishes.67 The court, however, did not directly address the
question of an affirmative right of a patient to demand and receive life-
sustaining care because the hospital petitioned the court to request a
change in guardianship, not for judicial approval of the cessation of
treatmen t. 68
On May 23, 1990, then-eighty-six-year-old Helga Wanglie suffered
a carcliorespiratory arrest that rendered her permanently uncon-
scious.° Over the next several months, Mrs. Wanglie was evaluated by
several neurology medical specialists who concurred in the diagnoses
61 Id.
62 See Paris et al., supra note 44, at 1012-13.
65 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.; see also Shiner, supra note 2, at 845 (noting that the opportunity to transfer is
necessary, and that only upon denial of transfer may consensus within the medical profes-
sion show that continued aggressive treatment is contrary to the standard of care, includ-
ing any viable minority views).
66 See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 Issues L. Sc MF.1). at 370-72 (holding that Mr. Oliver Wan-
glie was the best person to serve as guardian for his gravely ill eighty-seven-year-old wife).
67 See id. at 377; Daar, supra note 2, at 1242-45.
66 See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & Min. at 377.
69 See id. at 374.
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of persistent vegetative state and permanent respirator dependence."
Throughout this time, she was provided aggressive life-sustaining
treatment at the Hennepin County Medical Center. 71 Mr. Wanglie was
Mrs. Wanglie's husband of fifty-three years and, by Minnesota law, her
guardian. 72
 When the hospital informed Mr. Wanglie that continued
aggressive care was no longer serving his wife's best interests, and that
to continue the course of treatment would be contrary to standard
medical practice, Mr. Wanglie disagreed." He insisted that all treat-
ment be continued. 74
The hospital continued the course of Mrs. Wanglie's treatment but
filed a probate petition contesting her husband's fitness as her guard-
ian." After a four-day hearing, the court ruled that decisions concern-
ing Mrs. Wanglie's medical care were better made by her husband of
fifty-three years than by a court-appointed third party. 76 Importantly,
the court explicitly stated:
No Court order to continue or stop any medical treatment for
Helga Wanglie has been made or requested at this time.
Whether such a request will be made, or such an order is
proper, or this Court would make such an order .. are specu-
lative matters not now before the Court.77
The hospital chose an indirect path towards its goal of ceasing aggres-
sive care, arguing that Mr. Wanglie should be replaced as guardian,
rather than asserting that a patient does not have the right to receive
medical treatment contrary to the standard of care." As a result, the
court ruled only on the guardianship matter."
7° Daar, supra note 2, at 1242 n.4 (quoting Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's Ventila-
tor, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REY. 23, 23 (1993)).
71 See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 Issues L. & MED. at 376.
" See id.
" See id. at 377.
74 See id.
7° See id. at 369. Some media outlets reported that the hospital asked the court "for
permission to let a patient die against the wishes of the next of kin." Daar, supra note 2, at
1243 n.I4 (quoting Life in the Balance, N.Y. Tisms, Jan. 13, 1991, § 4, at 7). in fact, the hos-
pital petitioned the court only to request a change in guardianship. See Wanglie, reprinted in
7 Issues L. & Men. at 369.
Wanglie, reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & Men, at 376. The court also held that Mr. Wanglie
was in the best position to act upon Helga Wanglie's conscientious, religious, and moral
beliefs, and that he had indicated that he would do so. Id.
" Id. at 377.
" See id. al 376.
79 See id.
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Although some characterize Wanglie as a "right to life" case or, at
least, an implicit recognition of the right to demand treatment in the
end-of-life context, this is a mischaracterization of the holding and the
issues before the court." The court specifically declined to address the
issue of whether Mrs. Wanglie had the right to demand aggressive life-
sustaining treatment." Ultimately, the court held only that a guardian's
disagreement with the recommended course of medical care is not suf-
ficient grounds for his replacement.82 That holding is limited and ra-
tional, especially when the alternative is considered." To hold that a
hospital may petition the court for the replacement of an incompetent
patient's guardian solely because that guardian would not endorse the
recommended course of treatment would result in substantial in-
fringement on patient autonomy in the end-of-life setting, and reopen
issues that Cruzan v. Director; Missouri Department of Health and its prede-
cessors had since resolved."
Wanglie, then, represents the proposition that when physicians and
health care decisionmakers disagree, absent extenuating circumstances,
replacement of the decisionmaker is not the best course. 85 Essentially,
the case answers the easy half of the question that arises in the demand
context: health care decisionmakers may demand life-sustaining care
that does not conform to the prevailing standard of medical care with-
out being replaced by a third party. 86 The court, however, was silent on
the more difficult question, specifically whether the hospital is obligated
to provide such care.87
8° See id. at 377; see also Daar, supra note 2, at 1244 (comparing Wanglie to the U.S. Su-
preme Court case of' Cruzan a. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), to
the extent that both cases involved attempted assertions of patient rights that were met
with resistance from health care providers, and noting that in the end, both courts looked
favorably on the principle of patient self-determination). Professor Daar notes that, given a
sufficient level of evidence, patients may have the right to direct their medical care even in
the face of physician opposition. See Daar, supra note 2, at 1245; see also Veatch & Spicer,
supra note 4, at 21 (sharing Daar's view).
61 See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MEn. at 377.
82
 See id.
BB See Daar, supra note 4, at 224 (discussing the purposeful narrow tailoring of the
Wanglie ruling).
84 See Cruzan, 497 U.S, at 278; Wanglie, reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & Mtn. at 377.
" See Wanglie, reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MEo. at 377. Extenuating circumstances would
include an instance in which the decisionmaker is acting in a manner clearly harmful to
the patient, or demonstrably contrary to the patient's expressed interests. See id. at 376-77.
BB See id.
87 See id.
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3. In re Baby K and the Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act
In 1994, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided
In re Baby X and provided a partial answer to the second half of the de-
mand context question.8
 The court, citing federal anti-patient "dump-
ing" legislation, found that the hospital was obligated to provide re-
quested mechanical ventilation for an anencephalic infant when that
infant was presented to the hospital in respiratory distress, irrespective
of the prevailing standard of treatment for anencephaly. 89
Baby K was born at Fairfax Hospital in October 1992 with anen-
cephaly, a congenital malfunction in which a major portion of the
brain, skull, and scalp is missing. 9° Although Baby K had a brain stem
that allowed her to live with the aid of aggressive life-sustaining treat-
ment, she lacked a cerebrum, which resulted in permanent and irre-
versible unconsciousness. 9 i When Baby K had difficulty breathing on
her own at birth, the attending physicians placed her on a mechanical
ventilator.92
 Over the next few days, the attending physicians explained
to Baby K's mother, Ms. H, that most anencephalic infants die within a
few days of birth because of breathing difficulties and never develop
the brain they are born without." Nevertheless, Ms. H requested ag-
gressive treatment. 94
 Nearly one month after her birth, Baby K was
transferred to a nearby nursing home." Following that transfer, Baby K
was readmitted to the hospital three times with breathing difficulties. 96
After the second admission, the hospital sought declaratory relief as to
whether it was obligated to provide aggressive medical treatment that it
deemed contrary to the standard of care for Baby K. 97
The court held that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act ("EMTALA"), a federal statute enacted in response to the
practice of hospitals "dumping" patients who were unable to pay by ei-
88
 See 16 F.3d at 592. The parties in this case are anonymous in the court proceedings.
See id. Newspaper articles, however, identified the hospital as Fairfax Hospital, located in
Falls Church, Virginia. See Daar, supra note 4, at 225.
119 See Baby A; 16 F.3d at 598. The court limited its decision to statutory interpretation,
and explicitly stated that "lilt is beyond the limits of our judicial function to address the
moral or ethical propriety of providing emergency stabilizing medical treatment to alien-
cephalic infants." Id.
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ther refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or by transfer-
ring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized, re-
quired stabilization of Baby K each time she was presented at the hospi-
tal with breathing difficulties. 98 The court found that when Baby K was
presented in respiratory distress, a failure to provide immediate medi-
cal attention would cause serious impairment of her bodily functions."
Thus, according to the court, Baby K's breathing difficulties constituted
an emergency medical condition requiring stabilization in accordance
with EMTALA.'°° Although the court recognized the dilemma facing
physicians who are requested to provide medical care contrary to the
accepted practice of medicine, it found that a plain language reading
of EMTALA dictates that such care must be provided."'
In his dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse argued that the court's
application of EMTALA to the treatment of Baby K was improper.'° 2
EMTALA, he reasoned, was passed to remedy the evil of patient "dump-
ing," and that was not at issue in Baby K because the hospital had no
economic interest in ceasing aggressive treatment.'" Ms. H, Baby K's
mother, was insured by Kaiser Permanente, a health maintenance or-
ganization that covered the cost of the hospital treatment. 194 Therefore,
Judge Sprouse noted, the underlying issue was disagreement between
the health decisionmaker and the hospital over the course of end-of-life
care, an issue that was outside the scope of EMTALA's anti-dumping
provisions.'"
Judge Sprouse argued in the alternative that even if EMTALA was
applicable, it was wrongly interpreted by the majority.'" He recognized
anencephaly as a tragic illness that should be regarded as a continuum,
not a series of discrete emergency medical conditions to be considered
98 See id. EMTALA defines "emergency medical condition" as including:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient se-
verity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical at-
tention could reasonably be expected to result in—(i) placing the health of
the individual ... in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily func-
tions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
Id. at 593-94 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § I 395dd (e) (1) (A) (2000)).
99 Baby K, 16 F.3d at 594.
" See id.
101 See id. at 596.
102 See id. at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 598.
104 See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
105 See id.
106 See id. at 599.
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in isolation. 107
 He therefore argued that EMTALA would not have trig-
gered the hospital's duty to provide stabilizing treatment for Baby K
because there is no known treatment for anencephaly. 108 Moreover,
Judge Sprouse argued that if courts are to test the appropriateness of
care in this situation, the legal vehicle should be state malpractice law.' 09
That area of law is shaped by the prevailing standard of medical care
and, as such, would not have required aggressive treatment of Baby K."°
Baby K was roundly criticized, and many commentators extolled
Judge Sprouse's dissent.'" If the underlying medical condition is not
considered, some noted, it would be difficult to imagine any emergency
room scenario where a court would not order treatment. 112 Others felt
that the court's "plain meaning" interpretation of EMTALA stretched
the bounds of congressional intent. 113
 The statute, conceived to prevent
patient "dumping," was read to require the continued aggressive care
of an anencephalic infant, a result not within the purview of the stat-
ute's founding premise.'" At its core, Baby K represents judicial reluc-
tance to endorse the refusal of medical care over the objection of the
patient, and includes a controversial reading of a federal statute to that
end."3
B. Act First, Question Later?
The outcomes of Baby K and Wanglie indicate a judicial reluctance
to endorse the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment against the




 See id.; Daar, supra note 4, at 227.
109
 See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
11° See id.
'" See George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care—The Case of
Baby K 330 NE.W ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1543 (1994); Mark A. Bonanno, The Case of Baby K.
Exploring the Concept of Medical Futility, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151, 167 (1995); Daar, supra
note 4, at 227.
112 See llaar, supra note 4, at 227; see also A/IllaS, supra note 111, at 1543 (indicating that
a broad reading of Baby Kmay result in federal law dictating the standard of all emergency
treatment).
113 See Mark Strasser, The Futility of Futility?: On Life, Death, and Reasoned Public Polity, 57
MD. L. REV. 505, 509 (1998) (questioning whether EMTALA was properly interpreted, and
advocating that Congress pass a clarifying amendment specifying that EMTALA was in-
tended only to apply to indigent care); see also David Zell Meyerberg, Comment, The Fourth
Circuit's Baby K Decision: "Plain Language" Does Not Make Good Law, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 397,
423-24 (1995).
114 See Strasser, supra note 113, at 509.
113 See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596; Daar, supra note 4, at 227.
116 See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596; Wanglie, reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED. at 376.
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patient, however, courts are reluctant to impose liability on the health
care provider when it has refused care. 117 The precedent and concur-
rent message to health care providers is thus inconsistent. 118 More trou-
bling, though, is that outcomes seem to depend on whether the patient
has already died rather than the legally significant facts. 119
 The diver-
gent strands of cases create a state of affairs in which physicians are
likely to get better legal results when they refuse to provide nonbenefi-
cial treatment and then defend their decisions than when they seek ad-
vance (legal) permission to withhold treatment.'" This may discourage
health care providers from seeking guidance from the law, thereby
eliminating the safeguards the legal system could provide.'" That is a
troublesome state of the law when the consequences are life and
death. 122
1. Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia: Limiting
Liability and In re Baby K
In the 1996 case of Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia, the Fourth Circuit faced an issue very similar to the one it had
decided two years earlier in Baby K.' 23 In Bryan, the University of Vir-
ginia Medical Center refused to provide life-sustaining treatment to a
117 See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996);
John J. Paris et al., Use of a qNR Order over Family Objections: The Case of Gilgunn v MGH, 14
J. INTENSIVE CARE MF.o. 41, 41-45 (1999).
118 Compare Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596 (holding that EMTALA requires the provision of life-
sustaining treatment to an anencephalic infant regardless of applicable medical stan-
dards), and Wanglie, reprinted in 7 IssuFs L. & MED. at 376 (holding that the long-time hus-
band of a direly ill wife was not to be replaced as guardian simply because he was request
ing medical treatment contrary to the standard of care), with Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351 (finding
that EMTALA does not require the indefinite provision of life-sustaining treatment), and
Paris et al., supra note 117, at 41-45 (discussing the Gilgunn case, where a malpractice suit
stemming from the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment against the patient's wishes
resulted in a jury finding of no negligence).
119 See Ann Alpers & John M. Luce, Legal Aspects of Withholding and Withdrawing Life Sup-
port from Critically 111 Patients in the United Stales and Providing Palliative Cam to Them, 162 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 2029, 2029 (2000); Paris et al., supra note 117, at 44. Corn-
pare Baby X 16 F.3d at 596 (holding that EMTALA requires the provision of life-sustaining
treatment to an anencephalic infant regardless of applicable medical standards), and Wanglie,
reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. at 376 (holding that the long-time husband of a direly ill wife
was not to be replaced as guardian simply because he was requesting medical treatment con-
trary to the standard of care), with Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351 (finding that EMTALA does not
require the indefinite provision of life-sustaining treatment).
128 See Alpers & Luce, supra note 119, at 2029.
121 See id.
122 See id.
128 See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 350-51; Baby A 16 F.34 at 596.
448	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 48:433
critically ill patient. 124 Unlike Baby R however, the litigation arose after
the refusal of treatment and after the death of the patient. 125
 The pa-
tient's administratrix brought suit against the hospital for failure to
provide emergency stabilizing treatment under EMTALA. 126
Mrs. Robertson, the patient, was admitted to the University of Vir-
ginia Medical Center in critical condition with, most emergently, respi-
ratory distress.I 27
 The hospital stabilized the patient and treated her for
twelve days. 128
 After that point, because of the patient's dire condition
and pursuant to hospital policy, the attending physicians entered a "do
not resuscitate order" against the wishes of the patient and her proxy. 129
Eight days later, Mrs. Robertson suffered cardiac arrest; the attending
physicians and hospital staff made no attempt to resuscitate the patient,
and she died.'"
The plaintiff argued that, on the basis of Baby K, although Mrs.
Robertson suffered underlying respiratory problems, her emergency
condition was cardio-pulmonary failure that required stabilization un-
der EMTALA. 131
 In failing to provide resuscitation, the plaintiff con-
tended, the hospital did not attempt to stabilize the patient and, there-
fore, was liable under EMTALA. 1 S 2 The court rejected that reasoning,
finding that under the plaintiff's interpretation, every presentation of
an emergency patient to a hospital covered by EMTALA would obligate
the hospital to do much more than provide immediate, emergency sta-
bilizing treatment with appropriate follow-up." 3 According to the
court, the plaintiff's reading of EMTALA would require the hospital to
provide treatment indefinitely according to a novel federal standard of
care derived from the statutory stabilization requirement. 184 The court
was unwilling to accept that conternion. 135
124 See 95 F.3d at 350.
128
 See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 350-51; Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
125 Bryan, 95 F.3d at 349.
127 Id. at 350.
128 See id.
129 See id.
1 m See id.
is' See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 350-51.
In 1(1.
153 hi,
184 Id. at 351.
135 See id.
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In finding for the hospital, the court limited Baby K to its facts. 136
Also, the court warned against misinterpretation of Baby K, noting
that the case does not require indefinite stabilization for emergency
conditions. 137 EMTALA, the court stated, "cannot plausibly be inter-
preted to regulate medical and ethical decisions outside that narrow
context [of patient dumping]."
Therefore, the court found that after the patient is initially stabi-
lized, the patient's care becomes the legal obligation of the physician
and the hospital, and the adequacy of that care is governed by state
malpractice law. 139 A prima facie case of medical malpractice under
state law includes a showing that the treatment deviated from the
standard of medical care.'" The Fourth Circuit did not have jurisdic-
tion to rule on the matter because it was a state issue, but did note
that the hospital's do-not-resuscitate order was consistent with the
standard of care.' 41 Thus, in Bryan, the hospital's refusal to provide
life-sustaining treatment over the objections of the patient did not
give rise to liability under EMTALA, and also likely would not under
state malpractice law.' 42
2. Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General Hospital A Message Without
Precedent
The 1995 Massachusetts Superior Court case of Gilgunn v. Massa-
chusetts General Hospital involved the application of state malpractice
law to the refusal of care in the end-of-life context over the objections
of the patient, an issue raised but not decided in Bryan. 143 Although
tar, See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 352. The court interpreted Baby K as turning "entirely on the
substantive nature of the stabilizing treatment that EMTALA required for a particular
emergency medical condition." Id.
157 Id.
I" ld.
139 See id. at 351-52.
140 See id.
See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351-52.
142 see id.
145 See Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351-52; Gilgunn v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., No. 92-4820 (Mass. Su-
per. Ct. Apr. 21, 1995); Paris et al., supra note 117, at 41 (discussing the details of the Gil-
gam jury trial). Paris's coauthors included: Mrs. Gilgunn's treating physician, G. William
Dec, M.D.; the head of the Massachusetts General Hospital's Optimal Care Committee,
Edwin H. Cassem, M.D.; and the lawyer representing Massachusetts General, Frank E.
Reardon. Paris et al., supra note 117, at 41. The case drew widespread attention in the
medical and health law communities, but scholarship was delayed by the prospect of an
appeal; the plaintiff withdrew her appeal in January 1998, and the article by Paris and his
coauthors followed. Id. at 45.
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Gilgunn was a jury case and did not yield appellate review, the case
attracted much attention in the medical community. 144 Indeed, the
case was the first in which a jury was asked to assess liability involved
in a physician's refusal to provide aggressive life-sustaining treatment
against the wishes of the patient. 145
 Moreover, the case involved one of
the leading medical centers in the country with a standard-setting eth-
ics committee.' 46
Gilgunn arose from a dispute over treatment administered to Mrs.
Gilgunn, a seventy-two-year-old female who was admitted to Massachu-
setts General Hospital in early June of 1989 for immediate care of her
broken hip.'47
 Within nine days of admission, Mrs. Gilgunn suffered a
grand mal seizure, and continued to have uncontrollable seizures over
the following week)" Her condition drastically deteriorated until the
end of July, when she lacked any neurological response to stimuli and
her prognosis for functional recovery dropped to "nil."'" The attend-
ing physician informed Mrs. Gilgunn's family that aggressive treatment
was now "hopeless from a medical point of view," but the family contin-
ued to demand that everything possible be done.' 5°
Following the family meeting, the attending physician consulted
with the hospital's ethics committee, known as the Optimal Care Com-
mittee (the "OCC"). 15 ' The OCC evaluated the patient and her record
and concluded that continued medical care was not medically indi-
cated.' 52
 The family's wishes, according to the notes of the OCC, did not
justify mistreating the patient.' 53
 First, the intensive care unit team re-
sponsible for Mrs. Gilgunn's care entered a do-not-resuscitate order over
the strenuous objections of the patient's family.'" Next, on August 7,
the attending physician informed the family that Mrs. Gilgunn would be
144 See Paris et al., supra note 117, at 45.
145 Id. at 41.
146 See id.
147 Id. Unfortunately, Mrs. Gilgunn was also afflicted with debilitating long-term ill-
nesses, including diabetes, cancer, Parkinson's disease, and coronary artery disease. Id.
1411
142 Paris et al., supra note 117, at 9'2.
150 See id. The attending physician especially stressed the danger involved in CPR. Id. at
43. Given her condition, attempts at resuscitation would have resulted in multiple broken
ribs, hemorrhages, and exsanguinations. Id. Such a violent and bloody death, the physician
stressed, would not be consistent with the physician's obligation to do no harm. Id.
151 Id. at 43.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 42.
154 Paris et al., supra note 117, at 42.
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weaned from the ventilator that day. 155 She was, and she died three days
later. 156 The family filed suit in response.' 57
The result was a two-week Massachusetts Superior Court jury trial
held in April 1995. 158 During the trial, the hospital cited the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine Report as
support for the position that: "A professional has an obligation to allow
a patient to choose from among medically acceptable treatment op-
tions ... or to reject all options. No one, however, has an obligation to
provide interventions that would, in his or her judgment, be counter-
therapeutic."159 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the hospital. 15°
The jury found that, given the circumstances, the hospital's withhold-
ing of aggressive treatments did not give rise to liability. 161
The five cases discussed in this Part—Baby L, Wanglie, Baby
Bryan, and Gilgunn—arc the most prominent examples of physician
refusal to provide aggressive life-sustaining treatment over the objec-
tions of the patient. 162 Together, they send an inconsistent, if not in-
coherent, message to health care providers about how to handle these
end-of-life situations. 183 The cases may encourage hospitals to cease
aggressive treatment first, and defend that action later.'" The case law
does not provide a clear-cut resolution to the patient demands for
treatment deemed by physicians to be medically unwarranted. 165
II. A FUTILE DEBATE AND MORE PROMISING RESOLUTIONS
The futility movement—an effort by medical and legal scholars
to establish a class of treatment in the end-of-life context that health




158 See id. at 45.
159 See Paris et al., .supra note 117, at 44 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL BEHAVIORAL. RESEARCH, DECIDING To
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES
IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 44 (1983)).
180
 Paris et al., supra note 117, at 45.
161 Id.
162 See Bryan, 95 F.3c1 at 350-51; Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596; Wanglie, reprinted in 7 ISSUES
& MED, at 376; Paris et al., supra note 44, at 1012-13; Paris et al., supra note 117, at 45.
163 See Bryan, 95 F.3c1 at 350-51; Baby A 16 F.3d at 596; Wanglie, reprinted in 7 Issurs L.
& MEE). at 376; Paris et al., supra note 44, at 1012-13; Paris et al., supra note 117, at 45.
L 54 See Alpers & Luce, supra note 119, at 2029.
165 See Helft et al., ,supra note 4, at 296 (noting that disputes over end-of-life care will
continue and, thus, a process to address them must be developed).
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to provide—was an attempt to resolve the issues raised by demanded
life-sustaining care. 166
 Despite the massive amount of scholarship de-
voted to the issue, a consensus on the meaning of futile treatment
proved to be illusive. 167
 The medical community was nearly unani-
mous in its condemnation as futile of the treatment provided to, for
example, Baby K. 168
 Yet, the movement failed to achieve a consensus
on a general class of treatment that would be considered futile and,
thus, never formed an agreement on a substantive definition of futil-
ity.' 69
 As a result, the futility movement did not form a foundation for
the refusal of treatment, and ultimately failed at its underlying goal.'"
A. Movement Without a Meaning
The approaches to defining medically futile treatment may be bro-
ken down into two not-entirely-distinct groups: the quantitative/physio-
logical-based arguments and the qualitative arguments.'" On the chiefly
quantitative side, one prominent medical journal article argued that if
care was ineffective in the last one hundred cases, it may be considered
futile. 172
 The article's authors defined ineffective treatment as "treatment
that merely preserves permanent unconsciousness or that fails to end to-
tal dependence on intensive medical care." They concluded that there
is no legal or medical obligation to provide such care. 174
This definition of "futile" treatment, however, involves a curious
definition of an effect. 175
 Aggressive treatment that preserves a per-
166 See id.; Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 15; see also Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al.,
Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949, 950
(1990) (discussing qualitative and quantitative approaches to defining "futility").
167
 See, e.g., Council on Ethical & judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Medical Futility in
End-of-Life Care, 3251 AM. Man. ASSN 937, 937-38 (1999); Hell et al., supra note 4, at
293-96 (providing an overview of the futility debate); Lawrence J. Schneiderman, The Fu-
tility Debate: Effect Versus Beneficial Intervention, 421 AM. GERIATRIC Soc. 883, 883-86 (1994).
1614 See Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Sharyn Manning, The Baby K Case: A Search for the
Elusive Standard of Medical Care, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 9, 11 (1997) (pub-
lishing the results of an extensive survey of practitioners concerning the treatment pro-
vided to Baby K, and indicating nearly unanimous disapproval).
16° See Hellt et al., supra note 4, at 296.
17° See id.
/ 71 See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 17-20.
172 See Schneiderman et al., supra note 166, at 951. The authors of this article argue
that "when physicians conclude (either through personal experience, experiences shared
with colleagues, or consideration of reported empiric data) that in the last 100 cases medi-
cal treatment has been useless, they should regard that treatment as futile." Id.
173 See id. at 952-53.
17I Id.
' 75 See id.
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manent state of unconsciousness, or continues dependence on inten-
sive medical care, still has the significant effect of extending the pa-
tient's life. 176 Ignoring this effect is an inherently subjective assertion,
namely that the permanently unconscious life is not worth living or,
correlatively, is not worth preserving. 177
Another less controversial quantitative/physiological definition of
futile care is treatment that produces no physiological effect at a given
level of probability. 178 An example of this conception of "futile" care
would be CPR performed on a patient who last breathed three hours
prior to receiving the care. 179 Likewise, the use of antibiotics would be
"futile" treatment for the common cold because the treatment ulti-
mately has no effect on a viral condition. 180 Underlying this definition
of "futile" care is the relatively straightforward assertion that if the
treatment produces no effect, it is not medically appropriate treatment,
and its provision is not obligated. 181
This conception of "futility," although certainly a viable definition
of "futile" care, is not particularly useful in the end-of-life context. 182
Patients generally do not demand CPR three hours after death. 183 Nor
do patients or families typically request treatment that has no demon-
strable effect. 184 In the end-of-life context, life-sustaining treatment has
one readily apparent effect: prolonging life. 185 Thus, this conception of
"futility" is inapplicable in patient-physician disagreements over aggres-
sive life-sustaining treatment. 186
If the "futility" movement was to achieve its goal of providing medi-
cal and legal grounds to refuse life-sustaining care, the definition of fu-
tile care could not be so limited. 187 As one commentator noted, "even if
it is obvious that treatments that produce no effect should be consid-
ered futile, that does not establish that only such treatments should be
considered futile."188 Expanding the definition involved qualitative as-
I" See id. at 951.
177 See Schneiderman et al., supra note 166, at 951.
178




 See id; see also Strasser, supra note 113, at 515 (discussing the limited applicability of
this conception of "futility").







	 Strasser, supra note 113, at 515.
188 Id.
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sertions. 189
 The resultant conception of "futility" was care that had an
effect but no benefit.'" This definition included, for example, aggres-
sive end-of-life treatment that prolonged a terminally ill patient's life but
also extended or worsened that patient's pain.' 91
The qualitative definition of futile care necessarily involves a value
judgrnent. 102
 In the previously mentioned example of care that extends
life but worsens pain, the value judgment is as follows: extending the
life of a terminally ill patient without reducing the pain experienced by
that patient is not an end worth pursuing.'" To say that a physician is
not obligated to provide futile care in this instance is to allow the physi-
cian to determine whether prolongation is worthwhile.'94 Some authors
suggest that this power rests with the physician in the end
-of-life con-
text. 195
 Others forcefully argue that physicians have no particular ex-
pertise in this area because determining the benefit of extending life,
no matter how painful, is not a medical, but a value judgment.'"
In July 2000, the New England Journal of Medicine published the fu-
tility movement's de facto obituary, entitled 'The Rise and Fall of the
Futility Movement."197
 The authors, having been participants in the "fu-
tility" debate themselves, noted that the "illusion of futility is the mis-
taken assumption that it is an objective entity."'" As an inherently sub-
jective classification, the authors argued, designating treatment as futile
does not resolve disputes between patients and physicians over aggres-
sive end-of-life care. 199
 The futility movement demonstrated the diffi-
culty in clearly delineating a class of care that the medical community is
unwilling to provide. 200
 Although the movement failed, the problem it
set out to remedy persists."'
189 See id.
190 See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 17; see also Shiner, supra note 2, at 830 (discuss-
ing qualitative futility and the "effect but no benefit" definition).




195 See Daar, supra note 2, at 1256-57; Schneiderman et al., supra note 166, at 953.
1" See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 9, at 35-36; see also Edmund Pellegrino, Ethics in
AIDS Treatment Decisions, 19 ORIGINS 539, 594 (1990) (contending that "the physician is
neither morally employed nor qualified to make decisions about the quality of life of an-
other person").
197 See He'll et al., supra note 4, at 296.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 294.
299 See id.
281 See id. at 296.
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B. An Ineffective Statute
Three states have statutes meant to address patient-physician con-
flicts in the demand context, but all fall victim to the fallacy of the futil-
ity movement. 202 The Maryland statute is particularly representative. 208
Section 5-611(a) of the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act states, in-
ter alia, that "nothing in this subtitle may be construed to require a
physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that the
physician determines to be ethically inappropriate." 204 The subsequent
section, 5-611(b), provides that "nothing in this subtitle may be con-
strued to require a physician to prescribe or render medically ineffec-
tive treatment."205
The statute fails to define what is meant by "ethically inappropriate
treatment" or "medically ineffective" treatment. 206 Thus, its application
in the end-of-life context is questionable and, to date, has not been
tested.207 Section 5-611 (b)—specifically addressing "medically ineffec-
tive" treatment—may not apply to aggressive life-sustaining treatment
because such treatment has a demonstrable effect—the extension of
life.2°8 Section 5-611(a) has a potentially broader construction, although,
as the debate surrounding the "futility" movement demonstrated, the
precise definition of "ethically inappropriate treatment" may prove illu-
sive.209
The Maryland legislature was cognizant of the potential for con-
tinuing patient-physician disputes.21° Its statutory response, however, is
illustrative of the difficulties in framing the issue. 211 A vaguely phrased
statute provides little, if any, guidance. 212
2°2 See Mn. CODE ANN., HEALTH—GEN. § 5611 (West 2005); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Stipp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (West 2004).
2°3 See Mn. Cone ANN., HEALTH—GEN..§ 5-611; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 166.052 (providing for an extrajudicial procedure when the physician recommends
against life-sustaining treatment that the patient wishes to continue); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2990 (stating that nothing in the Virginia Health Care Decisions Act "shall be con-
strued to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that the physician determines
to be medically or ethically inappropriate").
"4 Mn. CODE ANN., HF,ALTII—GEN. § 5-611.
2°0 Id. § 5-611(h).
2°6 See id. § 5-till.
20'7 See Ferguson, supra note 41, at 1219-20, 1255.
2C18 See Mn. Com-. ANN., HEALTH—GEN. § 5-611(b) (West 2005).
2°9 See id. § 5-611(a).
no see id.
stt See id.
212 See Ferguson, supra note 41, at 1219.




.Questions about care in the end-of-life context involve a unique
confluence of medical, moral, theological, and family issues against the
backdrop of the ultimate finality—death. 213 As such, they are exceed-
ingly complex issues and ones that, because of their recurrent nature,
cannot be ignored. 214 The questions involve distinct views of what con-
stitutes appropriate medical care in the end-of-life context, and who is
best suited to make that determination—physician or patient. 215
These are difficult issues, as illusu-ated by the divergent case law
and the lack of consensus that marked the futility movement. 216 Patient-
physician disputes over aggressive life-sustaining treatment deemed con-
trary to the standard of medical care have four plausible resolutions:
(1) unilateral physician refusal over objections of the patient; (2) con-
tinued provision of care indefinitely, over the objection of the health
care provider, but consistent with the wishes of the patient; (3) a judi-
cial, case-by-case approach, initiated by either the patient or the physi-
cian; or (4) a well-crafted statute, possibly modeled on the 1999 Texas
Advance Care Directives Act. 217
L Unilateral Physician Refusal
Unilateral physician refusal to provide care would allow physicians
to cease the provision of aggressive life-sustaining care when such care
213 See Alums, supra note 25, at 1712-13. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the
seven-year litigation stemming from family disagreement over the end-of-life care of Terri
Schiavo. See id. Determining the course of her life-sustaining treatment involved the judi-
cial, legislative, and executive branches of both the state (Florida) and federal govern-
ments. See id. See generally ARTHUR L. CAPLANJAMES1 MCCARTNEY & Domic A. Sisri, THE
CASE Or TERRI SCI-HAVO (2006) (providing comprehensive documentation on the entire
legal timeline of the Schiavo cases).
214 See Helft et al., supra note 4, at 296.
215 See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 16.
216 See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 350-51 (4th Cir.
1996); in re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn.
Prob. Ct. Hennepin County June 28, 1991), reprinted In 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369, 376
(1991); lielft et al., supra note 4, at 296; Paris et al., supra note 44, at 1012-13; Paris et al.,
supra note 117, at 45.
217 See infra notes 218-240 and accompanying text. The first course of action, for in-
stance, was taken in Bryan. See 95 F.3d at 351. The second course of action is vigorously
recommended by Veatch and Spicer, supra note 4, at 17. The third course of action, for
example, was taken in Baby K See 16 F.3d at 596. For the fourth potential resolution, see
Thx. HEAL-rit & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (providing for an ex-
trajudicial procedure when the physician recommends against life-sustaining treatment
that the patient wishes to continue).
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is contrary to the standard of medical care; an obligation to provide
palliative care would still remain. 218 Medical literature reports that
some practitioners believe that this course of action is widely pursued,
though infrequently discussed with the patient or his/her health care
decisionmaker. 219 One prominent commentator contends that state
medical malpractice statutes allow unilateral refusal, but some physi-
cians are reluctant to refuse treatment over the objections of the pa-
tient because of liability fears. 22°
The current state of case law arguably incentivizes health care pro-
viders to refuse treatment first and defend their actions later, as prere-
fusal petitions to the courts have been unsuccessful from the perspec-
tive of providers wishing to end care, but postrefusal malpractice
actions have not given rise to liability. 221 Unilateral physician refusal,
however, is an unattractive option for two primary reasons. 222 First, it
would mark a significant retreat from well-established notions of pa-
tient autonomy. 228 Although an affirmative patient right to demand
treatment in the end-of-life context has not been recognized, the wishes
of the patients should, at the very least, be considered. 224 Second, given
the irreversible consequences of the refusal of life-sustaining treatment,
some standardized decision-making process is necessary to prevent rash
actions and mistakes. 225
2. Continue Treatment Indefinitely
This option, according to many commentators, is the default posi-
tion.226 If the patient requests treatment, they reason, the path of least
219 See Paris et al., supra note 44, at 1013 (discussing, but not advocating, this option).
219 See Schneiderman et al., supra note 166, at 952; see also David Cassarett & Mark
Siegler, Unilateral Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders & Ethics Consultation: A Case Series, 27 J.
CRITICAL. CARE MED. 1116-20 (1999) (studying the frequency of do-not-resuscitate orders
unilaterally entered by physicians without patient consultation).
220 See Howard Brody, The Physician's Role in Determining Futility, 42 1. AM. GERIATRIC
Soc. 875, 878 (1994).
221 See Alpers & Luce, supra note 119, at 2029.
222 See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 36.
223 See id. at 29.
224 see id.
225 See Helft et al., supra note 4, at 296.
225 See id.; Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 36; see also John .). Paris & Frank E. Reardon,
Physician Refusal of Requests for Futile or Ineffective Interventions, 2 CANnittinc.F. Q. HEALTH-
CARE ETHICS 127, 133 (1992) (discussing the potential effects of this fall-back option and
whether policies that insist on doing 'whatever the patient wants" undermine the dignity
of the patient and the integrity of the medical profession).
458	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 48:433
resistance is simply to provide that treatment. 227 This, however, results
in disregard for professional judgment in the practice of medicine. 228
The provision of aggressive care that is not medically indicated reduces
the physician from a professional and moral agent to a servant of the
patient's demands. 229
 Objections to the indefinite provision of aggres-
sive life-sustaining treatment also come from those who question the
allocation of resources in the end-of-life care context 2 30
3. Judicial Resolution on a Case-by-Case Basis
Disputes over the continuation of end-of-life treatment may con-
tinue to be resolved individually by the courts. 231 Yet, without a perti-
nent statute to apply, courts have taken divergent routes in these
cases.232 It is unlikely that this trend will soon be reversed. 233 Courts are
also ill-equipped for the timely resolution of pressing end-of-life issues,
as the timeline and outcome of In re Howe demonstrate.234 Fear of a
lengthy judicial process may result in health care providers adopting de
facto policies that encourage indefinite provision of treatment or uni-
lateral withdrawal, thus making case-by-case judicial decisions an impo-
tent tool for resolving this debate. 235
4. Statutory Resolution
A well-crafted and process-oriented statutory response at the state
level may be the most effective way to resolve these continuing con-
flicts.236 Such a statute should take into account the potential, demon-
strated in the case of Baby L, for a patient transfer to remedy the dis-
agreement concerning end-of-life care. 237 A statute also should establish
a process through which an actionable consensus on the applicable
standard of medical care may be achieved. 238 Furthermore, a statute
227 See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 15-17.
228 Paris & Reardon, supra note 226, at 133.
2" Id.
23° See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 29 (noting that rationing is inextricable from
criticism of indefinitely continued treatment at the patient's request).
2." SeeAlpers & Luce, supra note 119, at 2029.
252 see id.
2!3 See MEISEL, supra note 31, at 530.
"4 See No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *13-16 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Man 22,
2004).
233 See Brody, supra note 220, at 878.
236 See TEX. HF.M.:111 & SAFKTY COOK ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Stipp. 2006).
237 See id.
238 See id.
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should encourage patient-physician communication, and result in both
parties having a greater understanding of the ultimate resolution. 239
The 1999 Texas Advance Directives Act provides a model worthy of imi-
tation. 24o
D. A Model Statute: The Texas Advance Directives Act
1. The Act Expounded
The Texas Advance Directives Act (the "Texas Act" or the "Act")
sets out a straightforward process for instances when "the attending
physician refuses to honor an advance directive or treatment decision
requesting the provision of life-sustaining treatment. "241 Importantly,
it includes a definition of life-sustaining treatment. 242 The Texas legis-
lature eschewed the use of ethereal words, such as "ineffective" or "fu-
tile," to describe the requested treatment and, thus, avoided the pit-
falls of the Maryland and Virginia legislation. 243
The process established by the Act is initiated when the attending
physician recommends against life-sustaining treatment that the pa-
tient wishes to continue. 244 The physician must inform the patient's
health care proxy about this decision.245 Thereafter, treatment will
continue pending a review by an institutional ethics committee or
medical review board, and the proxy will be given forty-eight hours'
"9 See id.; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 746.
249 See § 166.052; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 746.
241 § 166.052(a).
242 See id. The Act defines life-sustaining treatment as:
[1] reatment that, based on reasonable medical judgment, sustains the life of
a patient and without which the patient will die. The term includes both life-
sustaining medications and artificial life support, such as mechanical breath-
ing machines, kidney dialysis treatment, and artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion. The term does not include the administration of pain management
medication or the performance of a medical procedure considered to be
necessary to provide comfort care, or any other medical care provided to alle-
viate a patient's pain.
Id.
243 Compare TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (Vernon Stipp. 2006), with
Mn. CODE ANN., HEALTH—GEN. § 5-611 (West 2005), and VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (West
2004),
244 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a).
245 See id.
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notice of the review. 246
 The proxy and patient, if possible, are invited
to attend the meeting and participate in the consultation process. 247
If the ethics/medical committee concludes that the attending phy-
sician has erred, the hospital will continue to provide aggressive life-
sustaining treatment. 248 lf, however, the ethics/medical committee
agrees with the attending physician that farther aggressive care is not
medically indicated, it must provide the proxy with a written explana-
tion of that decision. 249
 Then, while continuing to provide aggressive
treatment, the physician and the health care provider will assist the
proxy in finding a physician and facility willing to provide the requested
treatment. 250
 Moreover, the proxy will be given contact information of
health care providers that may provide the demanded care, or further
assist in arranging a transfer. 251
 If a willing health care provider is
found, then a transfer will be facilitated. 252
 In that instance, the original
hospital will arrange for the transfer and provide the necessary services,
but the patient will be responsible for the cost. 253
If, however, the proxy—with the aid of the health care institu-
tion—cannot find a provider willing to give the requested treatment
within ten days, life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn. 254 This
time period may be extended, with the permission of the appropriate
court, if there is a reasonable expectation that a willing facility will be
found if the extension is granted. 255 If aggressive treatment is with-
drawn, and the guidelines of the statute have been followed, the law
creates a legal safe harbor for both physicians and hospitals by grant-
ing immunity from civil and criminal liability. 256
2. Hudson v. Texas Children's Hospitat. Judicial Adherence to the Act
Although multiple end-of-life disputes had been resolved by ad-
herence to the process set forth in the Texas Act, the 2005 case of Hud-





249 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY Con: ANN. § 166.052(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
25n See id. § 166.052(a) (1).
251
 See id. § 166.052(a) (2).
259 See id. § 166.052(a) (3).
255 See id. § 166.052(a) (4).
254 See Tax. 1-IxArmi & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (5).
255 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (6) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
256 See id. § 166.046(a).
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judicial approbation in accordance with the Act. 257 Sun Hudson was
born with thanatophoric dysplasia, an extremely rare and fatal form of
dwarfism, on September 25, 2004.258 Less than two months later, on
November 18, 2004, the Texas Children's Hospital's bioethics commit-
tee notified the mother, Ms. Hudson, that it would discontinue care of
Sun within ten days, as provided in the Texas Act, unless another physi-
cian could be found. 259 The hospital found that further care violated
applicable medical standards and caused the child excessive pain. 26°
Texas Children's Hospital followed the process set forth by the
Texas Act.261 In fact, when Ms. Hudson requested a further extension,
until December 6, 2004, the hospital granted that extension. 262 When
Ms. Hudson expressed her desire for a further extension she was de-
nied, but she filed for an injunction to require the continuance of care;
the hospital paid for Ms. Hudson's legal fees. 263 At the outset, the trial
court issued a temporary restraining order, preventing the hospital
from discontinuing life-sustaining medical treatment.2" By February
16, 2005, the trial court ordered the restraining order lifted. 265 A pro-
cedural error by the trial judge—specifically, ruling on the timeliness of
a recusal motion himself—opened an avenue for appea1. 266 The proce-
dural issue was resolved by allowing a probate judge to deny the motion
to recuse, and the case returned to the trial court. 267 The trial judge
again ruled that under the statute, the hospital was authorized to with-
draw aggressive treatment. 258 On March 15, 2005, four months after the
initial ethics determination, Texas Children's Hospital withdrew life-
sustaining care from Sun Hudson. 269 The child died moments after the
withdrawal.")
747 See 177 S.W.3d 232, 233 (Tex. App. 2005); Bruce Nichols, Hospital Ends Life Support
of Baby: 1st Case of Its Kind Is Against Mom's Wish, in Accordance with Law, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 16, 2005, at 1A.
258 See Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 233.
252 Id.
260 See id.
261 See id. at 233-34.
"2 See id.; Nichols, supra note 257.
263 See Hudson, t 77 S.W.3c1 at 234.
264 See id.; Nichols, supra note 257.
285 See Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 235.
266 See id.
267 See id. at 238; Leigh Hopper & Todd Ackerman, 'Inside of Me, My Son Is Still Alive':
Baby Dies After Hospital Removes Feeding Tube; Case Is the First in Which a fudge Allowed a Hospi-
tal to Discontinue Care, HOUSTON Cu RON., Mar. 16, 2005, at Al.
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III. A PROCESS-BASED STATUTE As AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION
When the pertinent issue is patient-physician disagreement over
the provision of life-sustaining treatment in the demand context,
there is no shortage of schoIarship. 271
 Instead, the void is in the law. 272
To date, courts have inconsistently addressed the matter, and patients,
practitioners, and health care institutions are left to speculate about
their respective rights and duties in the demand context. 275 The Texas
Act demonstrates that states may effectively fill the void with a statute
that establishes a well-crafted extrajudicial process for addressing pa-
tient demands and allows for important, but limited, judicial review. 274
It is essential that any statute seeking to resolve patient-physician
disagreements in the end-of-life context not empower individual physi-
cians to be arbitrators of life-and-death decisions. 275 Furthermore, a
statute should recognize that there is not universal agreement on medi-
cal futility, but also ensure that if no health care providers are willing to
provide treatment, none are so obligated. 276
 The Texas Act meets both
requirements and creates a process in which patient involvement and
patient-physician communication are central aspects. 277 Thus, it pre-
serves respect for both patient autonomy and the medical profession. 278
The Texas Act also provides temporal boundaries for resolving dis-
agreements over treatment in the end-of-life context. 279 This allows for
timely resolution and streamlined judicial appeal if necessary. 28° The
2005 Texas Court of Appeals case of Hudson v. Texas Children's Hospital
275 See Daar, supra note 4, at 240 (arguing for a recognition of physician autonomy);
Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 36 (claiming that physicians' monopoly on end-of-life care
services obligates treatment when demanded); see also Menikoff, supra note 20, at 1108
(discussing the issues involved when care is demanded); Shiner, supra note 2, at 816
(chronicling the futility movement).
272 See Alpers & Luce, supra note 119, at 2029.
272 See id. Compare In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that EMTALA
requires a hospital to provide life-sustaining treatment to an anencephalic infant, without
regard to medical or ethical standards), with Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
95 F3d 349, 350-51 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that EMTALA does riot require indefinite
provision of life-sustaining treatment to critically ill patients).
274 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Supp. 2006); Fine &
Mayo, supra note 32, at 746.
275 See In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-293 (Minn. Prob. Ct. Hennepin County June 28, 1991),
reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 369, 376 (1991); Watch & Spicer, supra note 4, at 36.
276 See Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 744; Helft et al., supra note 4, at 295.
277 See § 166.052; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 744.
276 See tj 166.052; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 799.
279
 See fi 166.052; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 744.
2" See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Supp. 2006); Fine &
Mayo, supra note 32, at 744.
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was decided within four months of an ethics committee determination
that the care requested by the patient's mother was not medically indi-
cated, in accordance with the Texas Act. 281 By contrast, in Massachu-
setts—a state without a pertinent statute—In re Howe involved a two-year
protracted legal process after the Massachusetts General Hospital Opti-
mum Care Committee found that the treatment provided to Mrs. Howe
was in conflict with medical standards and so excessive as to be inhu-
mane. 282
The Texas Act establishes an extrajudicial process that fosters pa-
tient-physician communication and agreement. 283 If the disagreement
persists, though, the Texas Act provides for effective and timely avenues
of resolution. 284 In the absence of a statute like the Texas Act, potential
resolutions include: (1) the unilateral cessation of treatment by the
health care provider on uncertain legal grounds; (2) the indefinite
provision of medical care that is contrary to established medical stan-
dards and ethics, but consistent with patient demands; or (3) a lengthy
resort to the legal process that will most likely—after substantial legal
costs—require continued care or end in settlement. 285 The Texas Act
extracts the potential benefits of each of these solutions while avoiding
the pitfalls of each and, therefore, is worthy of imitation. 288
A. The Texas Act in Theory
The Texas state legislature addressed the issues presented by pa-
tient-physician disagreements over the provision of life-sustaining treat-
ment in the demand context, and did so comprehensively.287 First and
foremost, the Texas Act emphasizes patient / health care decisionmaker
involvement in the decision-making process. 288 The physician is re-
quired to inform the decisionmaker of his determination that further
281 See Hudson v. Tex. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Tex. App. 2005); see also
§ 166.052.
282 See. No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL 1446057, at *1 (Mass. Prob. & Fain. CL Mar. 22, 2005);
Liz Kowalczyk, Woman Dies at MCH After Battle over Care, Daughter Fought for Life Support,
BosToN GLouE,Itine 8, 2005, at Al.
283 See § 166.052; Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 744.
2a4 See§ 166.052.
2a3 See Baby ,K 16 F,3d at 596; Paris & Reardon, supra note 226, at 133; Paris et al., supra
note 44, at. 1012; Schneiderman et al., supra note 166, at 951; Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4,
at 17.
288 See Baby	 16 F.3(1 at 596; Paris & Reardon, supra note 226, at 133; Paris et al., supra
note 44, at 1012; Schneiderman et al., supra note 166, at 951; Veatch & Spicer, supra note 4,
at 17.
287 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY Coon ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Stipp. 2006).
288 See id.
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treatment is contrary to the standard of care, and the decisionmaker is
allowed the opportunity to participate in the subsequent ethics/medical
community meeting. 289
 These lines of communication are important for
the patient-physician relationship. 2" They also recognize that although
patients may not have an absolute right to receive a desired treatment, a
patient's request for aggressive life-sustaining treatment must be given
substantial deference. 291
Furthermore, the Texas Act includes the indispensable avenue of
resolution via transfer. 292
 As the first known case of physician refusal of
life-sustaining treatment, Baby L, demonstrated, the most logical reso-
lution to these disputes is the transfer of the patient to a willing pro-
vider. 293
 The Texas Act requires the original hospital to assist actively
the patient or proxy in finding a willing provider, so that the proxy is
not left to face that task on his or her own. 294
 If a potential transfer is
found, the Texas Act should, but does not, require the original hospital
to pay for the transfer if the patient cannot afford it—any appearance
of potential financial incentives in this sensitive area should be elimi-
nated.295
The window during which aggressive treatment will be provided by
the original hospital while transfer options are explored is set at ten
days. 296
 A line must be drawn to provide an established timeline for
resolution, but the exact time period should be determined by each
legislature.297
 The Texas Act logically allows for an extension of the ten-
clay time period if a court finds a reasonable likelihood that a willing
transfer hospital will be found. 298
 This form of judicial oversight is wor-
thy of imitation. 299
Perhaps the most effective part of the Texas Act is the manner in
which it requires a medical consensus to withdraw aggressive life-
sustaining treatment. 300 The attending physician is not empowered to




292 See§ 166.052(a) (3).
292 See Paris et al., supra note 49, at 1012-13.
294 See Tux. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (2) (Vernon Sapp. 2006).
292 See id. § 166.052(a) (4).
296 See id. § 166.052(a) (5).
297 See Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 796.
2" See § 166.052(a) (5).
299 See id. § 166.052(a) (6).
2" See id. § 166.052(a).
301 See id.
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review by the hospital, through its ethics or medical review board."
Even then, though, the hospital cannot withdraw care." Instead, it
must actively help the patient/proxy search for an institution that is
willing to provide the requested care." If it can find a willing provider,
the patient is transferred." If it cannot, the message is clear: the treat-
ment requested by the patient is contrary to widely accepted standards
of medical care." Indeed, if treatment is to be withdrawn over patient
demands, the Texas Act requires unanimity in the medical community
that the treatment is not medically indicated. 507
B. The Texas Act in Practice
The Texas Act is relatively young, and as such, has not produced
extensive review in the literature." One prominent early review, how-
ever, has been positive." The Texas Act has brought clarity and struc-
ture to an area of health law that had previously been confounding."
Robert Fine and Thomas Mayo conducted a case study to track the
effect of the law at Baylor Medical Center in the statute's first two years
of enactment."' They reported that ethics consultations in the demand
context have increased sixty-seven percent, and concluded that the
Texas Act has converted a less visible process into an explicit one."
The new, explicit process provides safeguards against rash decisions
and requires health care providers to be accountable for their deci-
sions, both to the Baylor ethics board and to the medical community as
a whole because their decisions are effectively reviewed by both."
The authors also noted the improved communication between
physicians and health care decisionmakers in the wake of the Texas
Act." In most cases, both parties are able to outline their stance and
the justification for that position." The result is greater understand-
302 See id.
303 SeeTEx. HEAurti & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (Vernon Stipp. 2006).
9°4 See id. § 166.052(a) (5).
9





308 See Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 743.
309 See id. at 744.
31° See TEX. HEAINN & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (Vernon Stipp. 2006); Alpers &
Luce, supra note 119, at 2029.
311 See Fine & Mayo, supra note 32, at 743-46.
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ing, by both the health care provider and the patient/proxy. 316
 Greater
understanding, logically, leads to fewer disagreements, which is a wor-
thy goal in the emotional arena of end-of-life decision making. 317 In
fact, at Baylor during the study, no family member chose to go to court
to seek an extension or to challenge the judgment of the ethics consul-
tation.318
C. TWO Paths to Resolution: Hudson v. Texas Children's
Hospital and In re Howe
The Hudson case was the first in the United States in which a court
approved the refusal of life-sustaining treatment over the objections of
the patient while that patient was still alive.319
 Texas Children's Hospital
followed the Texas Act, and so too did the Texas courts. 320
 Ms. Hudson
was able to air her arguments for continued care, and both the courts
and the hospital weighed those arguments against unanimous agree-
ment in the medical community that further care was not medically
indicated and was unethical.321
 The matter was resolved within four
months.322
The In re Howe case, by contrast, involved a substantially different
timeline before Ms. Howe's family and Massachusetts General Hospital
reached a settlement in March 2005. 323
 In November 2001, the hospi-
tal's Optimum Care Committee (the "OCC") recommended against
further aggressive medical treatment other than continued medical
ventilation, and sought to impose a do-not-resuscitate order. 324
 Ms.
Howe's daughter, and health care proxy, filed a complaint in the Supe-




 Compare 177 S.W.3d at 238 (laying the grounds for the trial court to allow Texas
Children's Hospital to follow the Texas Act), with Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351-52 (holding that
the hospital was not liable in a wrongful death suit under federal law for withholding ag-
gressive life-sustaining treatment from the patient, and implying that state malpractice
liability would hinge on adherence to the standard of medical care, which the hospital
demonstrated).
3Y6
	 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a) (Vernon Stipp. 2006); Hudson,
177 S.W.3d at 233-34.
ssi See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052(a); lludwn, 177 S.W.3d at 233-34.
322
 See Hudson, 177 S.W.3d at 235. Also, this timeline was substantially extended by the
procedural error of the trial judge. See Hopper & Ackerman, supra note 267. Absent that
error, the tragic case would have come to an end in roughly two-and-a-half months. See id.
ass See Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *1; see also Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital, Family Agree to
Withdraw Life Support: Deal Ends Long Fight over MGH Patient, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2005,
at 131.
324 See Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *10.
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rior Court of Suffolk County requesting a temporary restraining order;
in response to this action, the hospital agreed not.to enact the OCC's
recommendations. 325
The hospital continued to provide Ms. Howe aggressive treat-
ment for two-and-one-half more years, until her right eye ruptured
and required removal on May 31, 2003. 326 Shortly thereafter, on June
18, 2003, Massachusetts General Hospital filed a petition for declara-
tory relief, requesting a determination as to the appropriate level of
care that must he afforded to Ms. Howe. 321
The case continued for twenty-one months until the parties came
to an agreement on the duration of continued treatment in March
2005.328 Before the hospital filed for declaratory relief, its OCC found
that the provision of aggressive care to Ms. Howe required that the
caregivers violate their professional oaths, disregard the standard of
medical practice, and even compromise accepted standards of human
decency.326 Yet, such care was provided throughout the drawn-out proc-
ess.33°
The settlement at which the parties arrived also was inconsistent
with the stances of both sides. 331 Ms. Howe's daughter, and health care
proxy, argued that Massachusetts General Hospital was obligated to
provide the care she requested on behalf of her mother; the hospital
asserted that it was bound by the standard of care, which did not in-
clude the aggressive treatments demanded. 332 The result: the parties
agreed that Ms. Howe would be provided aggressive life-sustaining
treatment for three-and-a-half more months, ending June 30, 2005." 3
Ms. Howe died less than one month before the cessation of treatment
was scheduled. 334 The settlement was a seemingly abstract compro-
mise between no further treatment and indefinite treatment, but,
when the applicable law is inconsistent, that may be expected. 336
525 See id.
525 See id. at *11.
327 See id. at *1.
328 See Kowalczyk, supra note 323.
529 See Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *11.
s" See Kowalczyk, supra note 323.
551
 See id.
552 See Howe, 2004 WL 1446057, at *1.
533 See Kowalczyk, supra note 323.
s" See Kowalczyk, supra note 282.
555 See Alpers & Luce, supra note 119, at 2029 (arguing that medical centers are unsure
of their legal obligations when life-sustaining care is demanded); Helft et al., supra note 4,
at 296 (noting that disputes over the provision of end-of-life care are recurring, and the
medical community currently lacks a standard approach to such disputes). Also, the set-
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Disputes over end-of-life care are uniquely emotional and often
saddening. Unfortunately, they are also inevitable."6
 When the law is
unclear as to what is required when patients demand care that is con-
trary to accepted standards, none of the interested parties benefit. 357
Patients do not understand their rights, and physicians and hospitals
do not understand their obligations." 8
 Drawn-out disputes may result
and, as Howe demonstrates, health care providers will be faced with
violating professional standards and ethical norms by continuing to
provide care or ceasing aggressive treatment with uncertain legal con-
sequen ces."9
The Texas Act provides statutory guidance through previously un-
settled legal terrain. 340
 Patients and physicians understand the straight-
forward extrajudicial. process; it often opens lines of communication
that result in the avoidance of disputes altogether. 341
 When the disputes
persist, it provides for timely avenues of resolution, and judicial appeal
if necessary. 342
CONCLUSION
The issues presented when patients request aggressive life-
sustaining treatment that physicians are unwilling to provide are
complex and trying. They cannot be resolved by invoking a conclu-
sory and ambiguous term such as "futility." Current precedent, re-
flecting the difficult nature of the issues, provides uncertain guidance
for health care providers struggling to ascertain their obligations, as
well as for patients wanting to know their rights. Yet, this much is cer-
tain: patient-physician disagreement over end-of-life treatment will
persist, especially as life-sustaining technology continues to improve.
A process-based state statute provides the best possible resolution
to such disputes. The Texas Advance Directives Act provides an effec-
tive model. The process outlined in this statute extensively fosters pa-
tient-physician agreement about continued care, and, absent such
dement was agreed upon against the backdrop of the sociopolitical drama surrounding
the end-of-life issues of Terri Schiavo, and that case may have influenced one or both par-
ties. See Annas, supra note 25, at 1710.
335 See Helft et al., supra note 4, at 296.
337 See Men ikoff, supra note 20, at 1124.
333 See Alpers & Luce, supra note 119, at 2029.
335 See Menikoff, supra note 20, at 1124.
54° Seeikx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.052 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
341 See id.; Fine 8c Mayo, supra note 32, at 744.
332 See§ 166.052.
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agreement, allows the patient to seek a transfer to a hospital willing to
provide the care sought. It also provides a mechanism for ending
treatment when that treatment is inconsistent with the standards of
care and medical ethics by sending a clear message: if no physician is
willing to provide the aggressive treatment requested, then no physi-
cian is obligated to provide that treatment.
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